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23 OCT 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee  
United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Request for Review  
Harassment Study

REFERENCE : Memorandum from Executive Secretary,  
USIB Security Committee, dtd 23 September  
1974, Same Subject (SECOM D-4)

1. The proposed revision of the Harassment Study has been reviewed and I concur in its publication, with the comments as indicated below.

2. The introduction to the Harassment Study states it was developed to aid in the preparation of defensive briefings for persons traveling in or being assigned to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It should be stressed that it is not to be the sole source for such briefings nor is it to be given directly to persons being briefed. The examples of harassment and provocation presented in the study, although valid and useful in a certain context, are the unusual. These things do not happen to most people who travel to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Defensive briefings should be a balanced presentation of the realities of the situation and not an emphasis of the bizarre. Sometimes a reverse reaction is experienced when a defensive briefing leans heavily on the vast capabilities of the host security services. When the traveler finds that he has experienced none of the dreadful situations which have been described to him, he has a tendency to discount every aspect of the briefing.

3. The implication one might draw from the study is that the incidents described therein are likely to happen to anyone traveling in or assigned to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Although it is certainly possible that these things could happen to anyone, there is a considerable difference in the likelihood of such occurrences, depending

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upon the nature of the traveler. The casual short-term traveler and the official who is assigned to the area pose different problems. This is particularly true of Defense Attache personnel, who are a very special category and receive more intense attention from the host country security service than most American officials. A distinction should also be made between routine travelers and those individuals who have reason to anticipate they will be of particular interest to the host service, and the briefing tailored accordingly.


4. There are several specific implications which might be drawn from the study which are believed to be invalid:

a. In regard to the point made on page 5, paragraph 2 (which is repeated on page 16, item 15), it would appear to be incorrect to state that a visitor who conceals his military status is liable to prosecution, since there is no known law concerning this situation in the Soviet Union or the countries of Eastern Europe.

b. In regard to the point made on page 6, item 2, it is misleading to imply that since 1967 the Soviets have refused to issue visas to Finnish nannies coming to work for American officials. In fact, the example given on page 11, item 9, discussed a Finnish nanny employed by an American official in Moscow in 1972.

c. Concerning the general statement on page 4 to the effect that there has been an increase in provocations in Hungary recently, the implication is that anyone visiting Hungary can expect to have such difficulties; this is not necessarily true. The recent incidents have involved mostly American servicemen who were born in Hungary. Thus, the conclusion to be drawn is not that the Hungarian Service has become more active, but that American servicemen who are emigres from East European countries are vulnerable to hostile approaches when they revisit the countries of their birth.

It is suggested that the study be revised to incorporate the reservation expressed in regard to these three areas.

  
Charles W. Kane  
CIA Member  
USIB Security Committee

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Request for Review - Harassment Study

FROM:

Charles W. Kane  
CIA Member  
USIB Security Committee

EXTENSION

NO.

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DATE

27 OCT 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Committee, USIB

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